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Abstract
  This paper presents the economic effects of a child allowance policy using a 
three-period overlapping-generations model with endogenous fertility. The gov-
ernment operates a pay-as-you-go pension system and provides a child allowance 
to households. The revenue sources of pension and child allowance are financed 
by pension premiums and income taxes, respectively, which are both proportional 
to income. The primary result is that an increase in child allowance decreases per 
capita income and capital accumulation, whereas the effect on fertility is ambigu-
ous.
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1 Introduction
  Over the last few decades, several developed countries have experienced a declining 
fertility rate, as shown in Figure 1. This figure illustrates the total fertility rates of the 
G7 nations from 1961 to 2012. In particular, Japan faces not only lower total fertility 
but also a rapidly aging society. For a country operating a pay-as-you-go pension sys-
tem, such as Japan, declining fertility is a serious problem; not only will it slow eco-
nomic growth but will also lead to the financial collapse of the pension system. During 
the 1990s, the French government developed a family policy that included a child al-
lowance to increase the total fertility rate; consequently, the fertility rate showed an up-
ward trend, increasing from 1.73% in 1995 to 2.01% in 2013. 
Figure 1. Total fertility rates of G7 nations
Source: World Bank, World Development Indicators 1960-2012. 
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  In this paper, we present the overlapping generations model (OLG)1 with endogenous 
fertility, in which a pay-as-you-go pension system is operating, and discuss the effects 
of child allowance and pension premium rate on macroeconomic factors such as in-
come and capital accumulation. Moreover, we examine whether increasing household 
child allowance can increase the fertility rate.
  There is considerable literature concerning endogenous fertility such as Becker 
(1996), Becker and Barro (1988), and Barro and Becker (1989). Raut and Srinivasan 
(1994) and Rupa (1999) analyze the effect of old-age support on capital stock per capi-
ta and fertility in an economy where children directly support their aged parents 
through an income deduction process2
  With regard to child allowance policies, Galor and Weil (1996) and Fanti and Gori 
(2009, 2012) present the OLG model of neoclassical growth with endogenous fertility. 
They demonstrate the possibility of multiple equilibria and analyze the effect of child 
allowance on fertility and capital accumulation per capita. Galor and Weil (1996) dem-
onstrate the possibility of multiple equilibria using the CES production function, 
whereas Fanti and Gori (2012) prove that using the Cobb–Douglas production function 
and considering both the direct and opportunity costs of raising children, they could 
examine whether fertility increases with an increased child allowance.
  This paper aims to study the effect of child allowance on an economy with an old-age 
support system. We introduce a pay-as-you-go pension system into Fanti and Gori’s 
(2012) model. However, for simplicity, we assume only the monetary aspect of child 
rearing. Additionally, we consider a labor income tax proportional to income, instead 
of a lump-sum tax, to finance the child allowance assumed in Fanti and Gori (2012).
1  We introduce endogenous fertility decisions and pension systems into Diamond’s (1965) 
neoclassical growth model.
2  Raut and Srinivasan (1994) assume a Cobb–Douglas production function. Rupa (1999) uses the 
CES production function.
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  Within this framework, capital accumulation per capita is shown to be constant in 
equilibrium. The main result of this paper is that increase in the child allowance and 
pension premium would decrease per capita income and capital accumulation because 
these policies slow down the process of capital accumulation in the economy. In addi-
tion, although the effect of child allowance on fertility is ambiguous, an increase in the 
pension premiums could raise the fertility while providing a small child allowance.
The rest of the paper is organized as follows. Section 2 describes the research model, 
and Section 3 derives the equilibrium. Section 4 discusses the effect of child allowance 
policy on fertility, and the paper concludes with Section 5.
2 Model
2.1 Household
  We consider a three-period OLG economy, where the government operates a pay-as-
you-go pension system. Each individual is assumed to live through three periods: child-
hood, parenthood, and retirement. We suppose that all individuals are endowed with 
one unit of time for each period and that they do not make decisions during childhood.
  In the second period, each individual supplies one unit of labor inelasticity and earns 
wage wt. Every individual must simultaneously pay a pension premium qwt to finance 
pension benefits. In addition, they must pay labor income taxτwt, which is spent to 
provide child allowance. By denoting the pension premium rate and income tax rate as 
q andτ, respectively, the tax and pension premium burdens are then expressed by qwt 
andτwt, respectively. Moreover, an individual with children receives a child 
allowanceβ per child from the government. Then, each individual’s disposable income 
in adulthood is (1 –τ – q) wt +βnt, where nt is the number of children. In addition, un-
der the constraint conditions, each individual decides how much to consume ct, save st, 
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and decides the number of children nt. However, the rearing cost is m for each child
3. 
Taking c as the numeraire, we assume the price is one, and the household’s budget con-
straint in parenthood is 
ct + st + (m –β) nt = (1 –τ – q) wt, τ, q ∈ (0,1).
  In the third period, each individual retires and consumes. The consumption value is 
calculated as the sum of private savings, interest, and pension benefit:
ct+1 = (1 + rt+1) st + bt+1,
where rt+1 and bt+1  represent the interest rate and pension benefit, which each individual 
receives in the retirement period, respectively. Combining the above equations, we ob-
tain the following lifetime budget constraint:
                            ct + 
ct+1　 　
1 + rt+1
 + (m –β) nt – 
bt+1　 　
1 + rt+1
 = (1 –τ – q) wt (1)
  Each individual derives utility from consumption in the parenthood and retirement 
periods, and the number of children. Then, we specify the utility function of each indi-
vidual born at time t – 1 as follows:
                            ut–1 = (1 –φ) logct +γlogct+1 +φlognt, φ∈ (0,1) (2)
where (1 –φ) andφdenote preference toward consumption in parenthood and the 
number of children, respectively, andγdenotes the discount factor.
  By maximizing the above utility function subject to equation (1), we get the following 
first-order conditions:
                                                        
ct+1　  
ct
 ・ 
1 –φ
　 　
γ
 = 1 + rt+1 (i)
                                                         
ct　  
nt
 ・ 
φ
　 　
1 –φ  = m –β. (ii)
  Substituting equations (i) and (ii) into equation (1), the optimal allocations are deter-
mined as 
3  Borldrin and Jones (2002) consider the amount of rearing cost m and opportunity cost ntwt. For 
simplicity, we assume that only the rearing cost m per child is required.
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                            ct = 
1 –φ
　 　
1 +γ [(1 –τ – q) wt + bt+1　 　1 + rt+1 ], (3)
                            ct+1 = 
γ
　 　
1 +γ [(1 + rt+1) (1 –τ – q) wt + bt+1], (4)
                            nt = 
φ
　 　
(1 +γ) (m –β)  [(1 –τ – q) wt + bt+1　 　1 + rt+1 ]. (5)
  From equation (4), optimal savings is obtained as follows:
                            st = 
1
　 　
1 +γ [γ(1 –τ – q) wt – bt+1　 　1 + rt+1 ]. (6)
2.2 Firm
  The representative firm acts in a perfectly competitive market. There is a single con-
sumption good produced using the constant returns to scale production function, em-
ploying capital and labor. We assume the production function is Yt = AK
α
t Lt
1–α, where Yt, 
Kt, and Lt = Ntrepresent output, capital, and labor input in period t, respectively; A > 0 
is a scale parameter; andα∈ (0,1) is the weight of capital in the technology. Then, the 
intensive production function is written as 
                                                            yt = Ak
α
t , (7)
where yt ≡ 
Yt　  
Nt
  and kt ≡ 
Yt　  
Nt
  are output and capital per capita, respectively. We assume 
that capital fully depreciates at the end of every period and that the price of the con-
sumption good is one.
  Solving for profit maximization under the interest rate rt and the wage rate wt, we get 
the following marginal conditions: 
                                                    1 + rt =αAkt
α–1, (8)
                                                    wt = (1 –α) Akαt . (9)
2.3 Government
  The government operates a pay-as-you-go pension system and child allowance policy. 
In every period, the government imposes a pension premium and labor income tax on 
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workers. In period t, the size of the working population is expressed by Nt. We define 
the growth factor of the young generation in period t as Nt = nt–1Nt–1.
  The contribution revenues and payments of pension system at time t are denoted by 
qwtNt and btNt–1, respectively.
  The tax revenue in period t that finances child allowance is denoted byτwtNt and the 
expenditures concerning child allowance are expressed by βntNt. Therefore, a balanced 
government budget in period t must satisfy the following equations:
                                                        bt = qwtnt–1, (10)
                                                        τwt = βnt. (11)
3 Equilibrium
  In this section, we consider the dynamics of capital stock and fertility in the equilibri-
um. Substituting equations (10) and (11) into equation (5), the number of children in 
period t is 
                       nt = 
φ(1 + rt+1) (1 – q) wt　 　
(1 + rt+1) (1 +γ) (m –β) +φ[β(1 + rt+1) – qwt+1]
. (12)
  In addition, substituting the above equation into equation (6), individual savings is 
represented as
               st = (1 – q) wt 
γ(1 + rt+1) (m –β) –φqwt+1　 　
(1 + rt+1) (1 +γ) (m –β) +φ[β(1 + rt+1) – qwt+1]
. (13)
  The dynamics of capital stock is represented by
Kt+1 = stNt.
  Dividing the above equation by Nt, the dynamics of capital stock is described by the 
following equation:
                                                               kt+1 = 
st　  
nt
. (14)
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  Combining equations (8), (9), (12), (13), and (14), we get
                                        kt+1 = k
* (β, q) = 
αγ(m –β)
　 　
φ(α+ q (1 –α))
, (15)
where we assume m >β4.
  In this economy, the capital stock per capita is constant in the long run, as shown by 
Figure 2; therefore, fertility is also constant.
Figure 2. Per capita capital accumulation in the economy
4 Policy Analysis
  This section presents the effects of child allowance and contribution rate on fertility 
and per capita income.
4  Considering both the direct and opportunity costs of raising children, we get the dynamics 
similar to Fanti and Gori (2012). Then, without the condition of m >β, we can  discuss the 
dynamics in the economy. 
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  Differentiating equation (15) with respect toβand q, each partial derivative is
                                      
∂k*(β, q)
　 　
∂β
 = – 
αγ
　 　
φ(α+ q (1 –α))
 < 0, (iii)
                                      
∂k*(β, q)
　 　
∂q
 = – 
αγ(1 –α) (m –β)
　 　
φ(α+ q (1 –α))2
 < 0, (iv)
  That is, an increase in child allowance and contribution rate decreases capital accumu-
lation in the economy, as described by Figures 3 and 4. Therefore, the following propo-
sition holds:
Figure 3. Effect of an increase inβ
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Figure 4. Effect of an increase in q
Proposition 1. Per capita income increases monotonically with child allowanceβand 
pension contribution rate q.
Proof. Substituting equation (15) into equation (7), the production function per capita 
is expressed by
y* = A(k*)α= A ( αγ(m –β)　 　φ(α+ q (1 –α)))
α
.
For anyβ> 0 and q> 0,
∂y*
　  
∂β
= (– 1)αA (m –β)α– 1 ( αγ　 　φ(α+ q (1 –α)))
α
< 0,
∂y*
　  
∂q
= (–α) 
(1 –α)
　 　
(α+ q (1 –α))
 A ( αγ(m –β)　 　φ(α+ q (1 –α)))
α
< 0.
■
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  To analyze the effect of child allowance on the fertility rate, we rewrite the demand 
for children in the equilibrium:
                         n* = 
φ(1 + r*) (1 – q) w*
　 　
(1 + r*) (1 +γ) (m –β) +φ[β(1 + r*) – qw*]
. (16)
  To ensure that the fertility rate is positive, we suppose β(1 + r*) > qw*.
  We now analyze the effect of child allowance and contribution rate on fertility. Differ-
entiating equation (16) with respect toβand w*, we have
                   
∂n*
　  
∂β
= 
φ(1 + r*)2 (1 – q) w* (1 –φ+ γ)
　 　[(1 + r*) (1 +γ) (m –β) +φ[β(1 + r*) – qw*]]2
, (v)
                   
∂n*
　  
∂w*
= 
φ(1 + r*)2 (1 – q) [(1 +γ) (m –β) +φβ]
　 　[(1 + r*) (1 +γ) (m –β) +φ[β(1 + r*) – qw*]]2
 > 0. (vi)
  However, since an increase inβhas both direct and indirect impacts, we consider the 
total effect of child allowance on fertility. Differentiating equation (16) with respect 
toβthe total derivative is expressed as
                                           
∂n*
　  
∂β
= 
∂n*
　  
∂β
+ 
∂n*
　  
∂w*
・
∂w*
　  
∂k*
・
∂k*
　  
∂β
. (17)
  The first term of RHS of equation (17) represents the direct impact ofβon fertility. 
From equations (iii), (v), and (vi),
∂n*
　  
∂β
= 
∂n*
　  
∂β
+ 
∂n*
　  
∂w*
・
∂w*
　  
∂k*
・
∂k*
　  
∂β
,
                                                            +        +      +      –
therefore, the sign of 
∂n*
　  
∂β
is ambiguous.
  In addition, we examine the effect of contribution rate on fertility. Differentiating 
equation (16) with respect to q, we have
         
∂n*
　  
∂q*
= – 
φ(1 + r*) w* [(1 + r*) (1 +γ) (m –β) +φ[β(1 + r*) – w*]]
　 　
(1 + r*) (1 +γ) (m –β) +φ[β(1 + r*) – qw*]
. (vii)
  From the above equation, the effect of pension premium on fertility is also ambiguous. 
In an economy where child allowance is sufficiently large (since the sign of 
∂n*
　  
∂q
 is neg-
ative), a decrease in pension premium could increase fertility.
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5 Conclusions
  We present the effects of child allowance and pension premium on macroeconomic 
factors, such as per capita income, in the OLG model with endogenous fertility. More-
over, the government operates a pay-as-you-go pension system and provides a child al-
lowance. The results indicate that increase in the child allowance and pension premium 
have slowing effects on economic growth. However, the effect of child allowance on 
fertility is not clear. With regard to the pension premium, a decrease could have a posi-
tive effect on fertility if the child allowance is sufficiently large because of the trade-off 
between child allowance and pension payment.
  To provide generous social-welfare systems, governments must impose higher taxes 
on households to cover the necessary expenses. That is, households cannot receive ben-
efits without any additional cost in the form of tax and pension premiums. Additionally, 
higher taxes reduce the disposable income and savings of households. As a result, capi-
tal stock declines and economic growth slows. Financial support alone is not enough to 
raise fertility and sustain economic growth. For example, in France, where the total fer-
tility rate has maintained an increasing trend since 1995, institutions are established 
that support families with children, including a well-developed maternity and parental 
leave system. It is important to systematically support childcare in this model.
  Finally, it would be interesting to extend this model with a well-developed maternity 
and parental leave system, and analyze the policy effect on fertility.
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